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*Irish Jurist 201 “A family: two or more persons who share resources, share responsibility for
decisions, share values and goals, and have commitment to one another over a period of time. The
family is that climate that ‘one comes home to’ and it is that network of sharing and commitment that
most accurately describes the family regardless of blood, legal ties, adoption or marriage.”
Bivens, G. et al., “Home Economics: New Directions II”
(1975) 67 Journal of Home Economics 26-27.
“There is no institution in Ireland of a de facto family.”
Denham J., JMcD v PL and BM [2010] 2 I.R. 199 at 270.
Families by their very nature do not easily lend themselves to legal regulation. The very idea that
family formation can be marshalled by the law is itself highly problematic. Families are intrinsically
organic and dynamic entities, expanding and contracting over time, founded on, enriched by and in
some cases destroyed by emotions and sentiments that escape legal regulation and confinement.1
Nevertheless, our forebears saw fit to deal with the family in no less elevated a legal format than the
Constitution of Ireland 1937. Although acknowledging the family as the “natural … unit group of
society” and “as a moral institution … antecedent and superior to positive law”,2 the Constitution is
nonetheless quite prescriptive in what it does and does not recognise as a family for constitutional
purposes. The only family that is constitutionally recognised is that which is predicated on the
existence of a legally sanctioned union--namely marriage.3 The courts have consistently maintained
that the family envisaged and protected by Art.41 of the Constitution is thus confined and that, outside
the frame of marriage, Arts 41 and 42 do not recognise family life.4 Initially this prescriptive stance
was further complicated by a *Irish Jurist 202 constitutional ban on the dissolution of a marriage, a
stance that effectively conferred a “mandatory life sentence” for marriage. While this ban has since
been removed,5 the net effect of Art.41 is that a sizeable minority of families are not afforded the
status of family under the supreme law of the land.
The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which these prescriptive constitutional
tendencies remain realistic in light of increased family diversity and the popularity of new family forms.
This question is all the more pertinent given the recent introduction of the Civil Partnership and
Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”).6 In January 2011, this Act
came into force, creating three new legally recognised statuses--civil partnership, cohabitation and
qualified cohabitation. These new legal concepts reflect the growing prevalence of new family forms
based outside marriage, and a legislative concern--despite constitutional limitations--to regularise the
legal situation of non-marital couples, in particular of same-sex couples.
The outcome is that both social trends and legislative developments are outpacing the Constitution,
pushing well beyond the boundaries of the prescriptive notion of “family” posited therein. As a result,
the Constitution now seems increasingly out of step with social developments and legislative
responses to these developments. Equally, one might say that recent legislative reforms may fray the
boundaries of what is constitutionally permissible in terms of legal recognition of non-marital unions.
Certainly, some care has been taken to ensure that these legislative responses remain sensitive to
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constitutional restrictions--in particular by avoiding the label “family” for households that are not based
on marriage. Nonetheless, the net effect is that, increasingly, domestic law is moving beyond the
constitutional firewall that divides the “constitutional family” from units formerly regarded as irregular
and “beyond the pale”. The question posed here is whether these social and legal developments can
proceed beyond the shadow of the constitutional provisions on the family without changes to the latter
provisions.
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY DIVERSITY
The Constitution, in defining the family in restrictive terms, takes a firmly prescriptive approach to
family formation.7 The implication of Art.41 is that, whether or not the ideal reflects the social reality
for all families, the ideal of the family based on marriage is worth promoting. The view might be taken
*Irish Jurist 203 that a society is entitled to promote this ideal, and to reward and encourage those
who meet the ideal by according to the family based on marriage special privileges that do not attach
to other unions and relationships.
It might be assumed that, in so doing, couples will be encouraged to marry rather than live together
outside marriage. Nonetheless, efforts to contain the legal recognition of households outside marriage
have not in fact served to curtail the formation of family units outside the context of the marital family.
Cohabitation rates have risen significantly since the 1990s,8 with the number of cohabiting couples
more than doubling between 1996 and 20029 and increasing by 58 per cent between 2002 and 2006.
10 The 2011 census enumerated 143,561 cohabiting couples, almost 42 per cent of whom had one or
more resident children.11 That said, the 2011 figure suggests that rates of cohabitation are levelling
off. While higher in numerical terms than the 2006 statistic, the proportion of family units made up of
cohabiting couples has remained broadly static since 2006, at 11.6 per cent of all family units in 2006
and 12.1 per cent of all family units in 2011 (though the proportion of cohabitants with children and
the average number of resident children increased in the interim years).
Meanwhile, in the years since 1999 approximately one-third of children born each year have been
born outside marriage. Many children live, moreover, in one-parent families.12 While many of these
families are the product of separation, divorce and widowhood, a sizeable proportion are headed by
parents who were never married. The constitutional preference for marriage has not prevented the
formation of these families. Indeed, despite the significant legal advantages attached to the married
state, couples are opting in significant numbers to live together and to parent outside marriage.
Looking at these figures, one might be tempted to herald the demise of marriage, though in Ireland, at
least, the narrative of marriage in decline is misleading. Marriage rates reached their zenith in the
1970s and have since tapered downwards,13 though marriage rates in Ireland remain among the
highest in Europe, while Irish divorce rates are comparatively low by international standards. The
2011 census enumerated 820,334 households *Irish Jurist 204 containing married couples (with
and without children), making up just under 70 per cent of all family units in the State. Notably the
marriage rate (the number of marriages per year expressed per 1,000 of the population) in 2007 (5.2)
was only marginally lower than the figure for 1950 (5.4). Marriage rates dipped in the mid to late
1990s (to 4.3 in 1995) but increased again in the 2000s with 2000-2008 figures averaging between 5
and 5.2 per 1000. The rates dipped again in 2009 (to 4.8) and 2010 (to 4.6), though this may reflect
the current economic constraints that may lead to couples deferring nuptials, rather than an
ideological swing away from marriage.14
Indeed, a deeper analysis of cohabitation patterns reveals that while some cohabitants choose not to
marry in the long term, most envisage marriage at some point in time.15 This is supported by the fact
that such couples, on average, are much younger than their married counterparts.16 Meanwhile, the
average age at which couples marry has increased in recent decades.17 Many cohabitants, in other
words, are on a “marriage trajectory”, and while some cohabitants may split up before marriage,
cohabitation is not generally entered into as a long-term rejection of marriage. Marriage, in the main,
is being delayed rather than abandoned. As Lunn, Fahey and Hannan point out, “[m] ostly,
cohabitation appears to be a prelude to marriage” though they caution that “the increase in cohabiting
couples with children suggests that a minority of cohabitees may prefer continued cohabitation”.18 The
campaign for same-sex marriage emphasises this point; far from eschewing marriage as the preferred
model for family life, the campaign for equality of access to marriage arguably affirms the institution of
marriage as a desirable entity for the sustenance of family life.
*Irish Jurist 205 That said, it cannot be denied that marriage is no longer the only model for the
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formation of family life. The fact that 42 per cent of cohabiting couples enumerated in the 2011
census had co-resident children (and an increasing number have more than one child living with
them) suggests that the model of family posited by the Constitution no longer tallies with the reality of
family formation for many couples. While not rejecting marriage outright, couples increasingly see
alternatives or preludes to marriage as both viable and socially acceptable. The ideological
preference for marriage and the constitutional and legislative advantages attached to marriage have
not prevented the growth in family diversity. As Claire Archbold has observed (in relation to Northern
Ireland):
“Marriage is no longer the only, or even the preferred life choice for enormous numbers of people …
and if our legal system ignores these trends, it risks becoming irrelevant, and worse, providing no
protection to people who may be in great need of it.”19
WHEN IS A “FAMILY” NOT A “FAMILY”?
The Constitution accords to the family very significant privileges and rights. Though they are not in
fact absolute,20 these rights are quite heavily entrenched, giving the family a strong degree of
autonomy over its affairs.21 While the definition of the family to which it applies is restricted, the rights
and privileges attaching to that family, once constitutionally recognised, are extensive. The zone of
autonomy enjoyed by the constitutional family is, while not without limits, generously expansive.
Particularly in relation to children, the Constitution leans heavily in favour of granting extensive
prerogatives and privileges to the family based on marriage.22 While this approach has led to some
legitimate concerns that the rights of children in such units may *Irish Jurist 206 be subordinated to
the interests of parents,23 the respect accorded to the family is overall to be commended. Claude
Lévi-Strauss has pointed out that intermediating bodies--of which the family is possibly the most
important--provide a significant bulwark against overbearing State power.24 He suggests that the bond
between citizen and State is imperfect and impersonal compared with the bond between individuals
and families and other relatively small communities of interest. Charting the rise of the Nation-State in
the late 1700s, he notes the suspicion that the rulers of this new order had of intermediating
institutions, such as churches and guilds--bodies that threatened to detract from the loyalty “owed” to
the central authority. The concern of the newly emerging Nation-States was to liberate individuals
from these “intermediate” organisations so that their loyalty to the State would be complete. Seen
from this perspective, the family may be viewed as an important bulwark against excessive State
power in the lives of individuals.
The difficulty, however, is that in so far as the Constitution is concerned, the constitutional safeguards
available to the family apply only to the family based on marriage. In linguistic terms, the term “family”
can have many diverse meanings.25 In Re Brewis; Brewis v Brewis 26 (an Australian case) O'Bryan J.
of the Supreme Court of Victoria observed that “… the word ‘family’ is a word of most uncertain
import. It can mean many things according to its context and in some contexts it is impossible to say
in what particular sense it is used”.27 The family of which the Irish Constitution speaks, however, is of
a very specific kind, Art.41.3.1° confirming that the family with which the Constitution is concerned is
the family based on marriage:
“The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is
founded, and to protect it against attack.” (Emphasis added)
*Irish Jurist 207 The manner in which this pledge is phrased indicates that the linkage between
marriage and the family is not so much expressly stated as taken for granted by the Constitution. The
unavoidable implication--confirmed by the courts on multiple occasions--is that marriage (and
marriage alone) “makes” a family.
The outcome is not merely that the family based on marriage is privileged over other types of family.
The Constitution recognises--as case law confirms--no other type of family. As I have observed
elsewhere, “… marriage is constitutionally posited not merely as an ideal but quite simply as the only
option for the inception of a constitutionally recognised family”.28 This is perhaps unproblematic when
social practices match the legal norm. Curiously, in the 1930s the proportion of the population that
was single was very high. Indeed, Fahey and Field note that “marriage avoidance among young
adults today [in 2008] is as common as it was in the 1930s”, though they clarify that:
“… it has very different significance for family formation. Prior to the sexual revolution of the 1960s
and 1970s, marriage was the gateway to sex and reproduction: pre-marital sex and, even more,
non-marital childbearing were strongly disapproved of and, as far as we can tell from the available
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evidence, occurred at a relatively low rate. Thus, the low level of marriage in the 1930s entailed a
similarly low level of family formation. Today, marriage has lost much of the gateway function it
possessed in the past: sex and childbearing before marriage are now more or less accepted as
normal.”29
Thus, in a modern-day context, where a significant number of couples cohabit outside marriage,
many with children, the Constitution's blindness to the lived reality of family diversity becomes
problematic. The question arises whether the law can address this lived reality without falling foul of
the Constitution and, if so, to what extent. The question is especially pertinent in the context of
same-sex couples, given that the latter cannot legally marry.30
A further--and not so widely recognised--reality is that the model of family to which the Constitution
refers is the narrow model of the nuclear family as opposed to the more extended family model of
pre-industrial times. This is confirmed implicitly by Art.42, which refers to the rights and duties of
parents in respect of their children. In McCombe v Sheehan 31 Murnaghan J. concluded that the
meaning of “family” in Art.41 of the Constitution was restricted to *Irish Jurist 208 parents and
children. It followed, he added, that the term “family” when used in rent control legislation must
necessarily bear the same meaning (though he appeared to admit of some flexibility in saying that
this would be the case “unless the contrary intention appeared”).32 In Jordan v O'Brien 33 the Supreme
Court overruled McCombe on this specific point, ruling that the term “family” when used in rent control
legislation could bear a wider meaning than the term “family” in the Constitution, though Lavery J.
conceded nonetheless that Murnaghan J. “may have been correct” in his conclusion that the
constitutional meaning of family is confined to parents and children.34
This point is borne out in relation to grandparents who, even when they have taken on a parental role,
have no constitutional rights in respect of their grandchildren.35 Legally, they have a right only to apply
for access in respect of their grandchildren,36 and no express right to seek custody. This appears to
reflect a rather tidy, confined and atomised understanding of the constitutional family that jars with
more fluid, popular notions of what or who is “family”. Indeed, in general, outside the specific context
of adoption, social or “de facto” parenthood (as opposed to biological parenthood) enjoys no
constitutional recognition and scant legal protection, a point emphasised by the verdict in McD v L
discussed below.
The centrality of marriage as the foundation of family is further emphasised by the fact that the
Constitution recognises married couples without children as a “family” for constitutional purposes.37
As such, somewhat counter-intuitively (given that in ordinary language couples who wish to have
children speak of a desire to “start a family”), children do not necessarily make a constitutional
“family”. Everything depends on the marital status of their parents. A couple with children, if the
couple are unmarried, are not a family for constitutional purposes, though a married couple with no
children are.38 The lack of procreative capacity or intention is no barrier to a valid marriage,39 though,
notwithstanding this fact, marriage is still confined to heterosexual couples.
The exclusive emphasis on the marital family gives rise to a curious paradox at the heart of Art.41. On
the one hand, Art.41 affirms the “natural” character *Irish Jurist 209 of the family. It is an entity,
moreover, that is “antecedent and superior to positive law”. Yet, the foundation stone of the
constitutional family--and what distinguishes a family from a “non-family”--is itself a status accessible
only by compliance with measures stipulated by positive law. Absent a legally recognised marriage
between the adults who head up the institution, a household is not a “family”. This point is
emphasised by Re J an Infant, 40 where the High Court concluded that the marriage of the parents of
a child subsequent to the birth of their child rendered the parents and child a family for constitutional
purposes.41
In essence then, the constitutional family--which is regarded as a natural unit group existing
independently of man-made law--is itself dependent for its existence on compliance with formalities
and requirements as to capacity that are laid down in legislation.42 The resulting paradox is that the
family is seen as a natural institution yet one that comes into being only when a legal status is
conferred, the acquisition of which is determined by conditions laid down in legislation.
This paradox is resolved in part by reference to the constitutional right to marry, as affirmed in O'Shea
v Ireland. 43 In that case, the High Court confirmed that a law preventing a divorced woman from
marrying her ex-husband's brother infringed the constitutional right to marry, given that the ban could
not be rationally justified as necessary in light of modern conditions. Laffoy J. confirmed that there is a
right to marry protected by Art.40.3 that, while not absolute, can be restricted only where necessary to
Page4
safeguard other rights, to uphold the integrity of marriage, or to promote (in a proportionate manner) a
particular legitimate purpose. In Ryan v Attorney General, 44 Kenny J. intimated (obiter) that the right
to marry was a personal right that “flowed from the Christian and democratic nature of the State”, and
thus was a right protected by Art.40.3 of the Constitution. The existence of this constitutional right
(which notably confers an entitlement only to marry a person of the opposite sex)45 *Irish Jurist 210
underlines that marriage itself, like the family, may be regarded as a natural institution.
It remains the case, however, that access to marriage and thus to family status is predicated on
compliance with legally ordained requirements and formalities. This underlines the deepest difficulty
with the constitutional approach--that it attempts to impose an ordered, legally sanctioned route into
family life that ignores, fundamentally, the organic manner in which familial ties are formed. (It could,
of course, be argued that marriage helps to cement these ties, though no amount of laws will force a
couple to love or respect each other or to sustain such ties in the wake of a relationship breaking
down). Indeed, the best evidence of this lies in the fact that, notwithstanding the significant privileges
attaching to marriage, many couples now cohabit outside marriage, and a growing number of children
are born to unwed parents. In other words, if the purpose of confining the constitutional definition of
the family is to ensure family formation takes place within the confines of marriage, the experiment
has, at least in part, failed.
THE NON-MARITAL UNIT IN THE COURTS
The Supreme Court, nonetheless, has been nothing if not consistent in its insistence that the family
unit envisaged by the Constitution is that based on marriage. In the State (Nicolaou) v An Bord
Uchtála 46 the court first emphasised that the rights accorded by Art.41 were confined to marital
families. Mr Nicolaou and his former girlfriend, Ms Donnelly, were natural parents of a daughter, born
in 1961. The couple had cohabited briefly in London, and were in a committed relationship, though
the couple later split, due primarily, it seems, to religious differences.47 On the birth of their daughter,
Ms Donnelly arranged to place her for adoption, which was finalised in 1961. Mr Nicolaou, however,
objected to the adoption, arguing that it was arranged without his consent and without giving him an
opportunity to be heard in relation to the matter. Both the High Court and Supreme Court confirmed
that he had no legal right in the particular circumstances either to veto the adoption or to demand that
he be heard by the Adoption Board prior to its decision.48 Both courts also rejected Mr Nicolaou's
contention that the failure to grant him a veto over the adoption or a right to be consulted in relation to
it infringed his constitutional rights.49 *Irish Jurist 211 In particular, the courts concluded that Mr
Nicolaou was not a member of a family protected by Art.41. Henchy J., in the High Court, remarked
that:
“… [N]o union or grouping of people is entitled to be designated a family for the purposes of [Art.41] if
it is founded on any relationship other than marriage. If the solemn guarantees and rights which the
Article gives to the family were held to be extended to units of people founded on extra-marital
unions, such interpretation would be quite inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Article.”50
He went on to conclude that the conferral of constitutional protection on extramarital families would be
in breach of the special position conferred on marriage by Art.41.3.1°:
“For the State to award equal constitutional protection to the family founded on marriage and the
‘family’ founded on an extra-marital union would in effect be a disregard of the pledge which the State
gives in Article 41.3.1, to guard with special care the institution of marriage.”51
In the Supreme Court, Walsh J. agreed, observing that:
“It is quite clear from the provisions of Article 41, and in particular section 3 thereof, that the ‘family’
referred to in this Article is the family which is founded on the institution of marriage and, in the
context of the Article, marriage means valid marriage under the law for the time being in force in the
State.”52
Doyle has argued convincingly that these dicta do not necessarily preclude legislative recognition of
the relationships based outside marriage.53 A close reading of the passages from Nicolaou cited
above indicates that the judges' concern was with the interpretation of Art.41, the clear import being
that Art.41 cannot be read as affording constitutional rights or recognition to non-marital units. This is
borne out by further comments of Walsh J., who intimated (in *Irish Jurist 212 Nicolaou ) that the
exclusive character of Art.41 did not necessarily preclude recognition of non-marital unions in other
legal contexts:
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“While it is quite true that unmarried persons cohabiting together and the children of their union may
often be referred to as a family and have many, if not all, of the outward appearances of a family, and
may indeed for the purposes of a particular law be regarded as such, nevertheless so far as Article 41
is concerned the guarantees therein contained are confined to families based upon marriage.” 54
(emphasis added)
This suggests that the constitutionally restricted understanding of family does not necessarily prevent
legislative recognition. The reference to “a particular law”, however, may indicate that the Oireachtas
may act in specific contexts only, and that general schemes that confer family status on non-marital
unions may not be permitted. That said, these statements underline that the legislature is not
necessarily hamstrung in its recognition of family relationships outside marriage.
While non-marital units do not enjoy any recognition under Art.41, the relationship of a child and its
mother attracts separate constitutional protection. The Supreme Court in Nicolaou acknowledged that
the mother of a child born outside marriage enjoyed constitutional rights in respect of the relationship
with her child, albeit under Art.40.3 and not Art.41.55 In 1980 the Supreme Court in G v An Bord
Uchtála 56 confirmed that a non-marital child had personal constitutional rights under Art.40.3 of the
Constitution to the care of its mother.57 A majority of the judges ruled, moreover, that the non-marital
mother also had constitutional rights under Art.40.3 in respect of her child. This means that a
non-marital mother--in respect of her child--has a constitutional right to custody (though it is one that
is not so heavily entrenched as the right of the marital parent: it may, in particular, be waived).
Nevertheless, O'Higgins C.J. re-emphasised that:
“… the mother is not the mother of a family, in the sense in which the term is used in the Constitution.
Article 41 of the Constitution … refers exclusively to the family founded and based on the institution of
marriage.”58
*Irish Jurist 213 The passage of time has not dented this perspective.59 Walsh J., in the People
(DPP) v JT, 60 again confirmed that the family based outside marriage was not a family as envisaged
by Art.41. In WO'R v EH, 61 the Supreme Court reiterated this point, Hamilton C.J. noting that “… [a]
de facto family, or any rights arising therefrom, is not recognised by the Constitution or by any of the
enactments of the Oireachtas dealing with the custody of children”.62 Later, the same judge observed
that “The concept of a ‘de facto’ family is unknown to the Irish Constitution”,63 though aspects of the
judgment suggest that the court may have regard in practice to the existence of de facto family
arrangements.
In O'B v S 64 the constitutional preference for marriage in Art.41.3.1° was read as permitting legislative
discrimination against children born outside marriage. The court found that measures that denied a
non-marital child any right to succeed to her father's estate on his intestacy (in circumstances where
children born inside marriage would have had such a right) did not infringe the constitutional
guarantee of equality as they could be justified as upholding the special position of marriage under
Art.41.3. Thus, although the courts have confirmed that non-marital children have constitutional rights
equivalent in quality and scope to those of children born inside marriage,65 the State, in maintaining
the institution of marriage, is entitled, though not, it would seem, obliged, to discriminate in a manner
prejudicial to non-marital children. Given that a child has no control over the marital status of its
parents, it is unclear how penalising the child can feasibly be seen to promote the institution of
marriage. If the aim is to encourage parents to marry, favouring the marital child over the non-marital
is arguably a misdirected methodology. As a result of the Status of Children Act 1987, the legal rights
of children born outside marriage now are largely equivalent to those of marital children. The point
remains, however, that non-marital children are afforded such equal treatment by virtue of legislation
only, and not by the Constitution.
The Constitution Review Group in 1996 suggested that, while marriage should continue to be
constitutionally favoured, the constitutional definition of family life should be expanded to include units
that exist outside the frame of marriage.66 The legislature has, however, proved rather unenthusiastic
in relation to redefining family life. A 2006 Joint Oireachtas committee report cautioned *Irish Jurist
214 against changing the constitutional definition, observing that a referendum on the topic would
likely prove divisive, would not necessarily be guaranteed to pass and might yield unforeseen
outcomes.67 In particular, the Committee noted that it would not be “practicable to provide
constitutional recognition for all family types while at the same time maintaining the uniqueness of
one”.68 The Committee instead favoured a legislative response conferring rights on non-marital
couples, recommending partnership legislation for same-sex and opposite-sex couples and a
presumptive scheme that, curiously, would have applied only to opposite-sex couples.69
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SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE COURTS
Though ostensibly in a similar constitutional position in that neither is treated as a family for the
purpose of Art.41, same-sex couples may be distinguished from unmarried opposite-sex couples in
two important respects. The first is that in the case of same-sex couples there is the added dimension
of the historical stigma attached to homosexual relationships. Unmarried opposite-sex couples
historically were discriminated against because they were not married; same-sex couples, by
contrast, were primarily stigmatised not because of lack of legal status but due to the much more
profound, innate factor of their sexual orientation.70 Similarly, while unmarried opposite-sex couples
have it within their power to remedy the absence of constitutional protection by marrying, same-sex
couples cannot, as they are precluded from marrying.71 The result is invidious, to say the least.
Same-sex couples cannot become “families” in the *Irish Jurist 215 constitutional sense without
marrying, but in turn cannot marry.72 They and their families are thus denied the important
constitutional protections afforded by such constitutional status, leaving it to legislators to determine
what rights and obligations will be afforded such couples.
This “Catch-22” situation might suggest that the courts would have taken a more nuanced approach
to same-sex couples, though this has not been the case. Same-sex couples are no more entitled than
opposite-sex couples outside marriage to constitutional recognition as “families”. In JMcD v PL and
BM 73 a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that a lesbian couple and the biological child of one of
the women were not a “family” enjoying recognition as such under either the Constitution or the
European Convention on Human Rights. The plaintiff in this case had agreed to assist a lesbian
couple to have a child by donating his sperm to one of the couple. In doing so, he agreed in writing
that while he would be allowed to visit the child and play some part in its life, he would not undertake
a parental role. The plaintiff originally acknowledged that the lesbian couple would be considered as
the child's parents, the plaintiff agreeing to a role as “favourite uncle”. When the child was born,
however, his attitude changed. In spite of the agreement, he sought a more extensive role in the life
of the child. As relations between the plaintiff and the lesbian couple deteriorated, the plaintiff sought
guardianship and access in respect of the child.
Although the plaintiff initially succeeded in obtaining an interim injunction preventing the couple from
moving to Australia, the High Court ultimately denied him either guardianship or access. Hedigan J.
placed particular emphasis on what he considered to be the rights of the couple and their child as a
family under art.8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He ruled that the couple and their
child constituted a de facto family that attracted the protection of art.8.74 While acknowledging that the
European Court of Human Rights *Irish Jurist 216 had (at that time) not yet recognised a lesbian
couple residing with a child as a “family” for this purpose,75 Hedigan J. relied on the verdict of the
European Court of Human Rights in X, Y and Z v United Kingdom. 76 This decision, he believed,
evidenced a “substantial movement” 77 in the direction of recognising same-sex families under the
Convention.78 Hedigan J. thus concluded that:
“… where a lesbian couple live together in a long term committed relationship of mutual support
involving close ties of a personal nature which, were it a heterosexual relationship, would be regarded
as a de facto family, they must be regarded as themselves constituting a de facto family enjoying
rights as such under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, where a child
is born into such a family unit and is cared for and nurtured therein, then the child itself is a part of
such a de facto family unit. Applying this to the case here it seems clear that between the
respondents and the infant there exist such personal ties as give rise to family rights under article 8 of
the ECHR.”79
He added that the Constitution's silence as to the existence of such families did not preclude judicial
recognition of the de facto family, pointing to instances where the courts recognised the existence of
such families (such as WO'R v EH discussed below).
Based on this view, Hedigan J. refused to grant either guardianship or access to the father, reasoning
that to do so would undermine the settled family life of *Irish Jurist 217 the couple and their child.
This conclusion was supported by an independent psychiatrist's report to the court which had
emphasised the disruption to the child should the father be granted any legal remedy in respect of the
child.80
The Supreme Court profoundly disagreed with the High Court conclusion. Although it also declined
the plaintiff's application for guardianship, it overturned the refusal of access, ruling that the child's
interests would be best served by contact with its father.81 Most notably, the Supreme Court ruled that
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the High Court had erred in considering the couple and their child to be a family for the purpose of
Irish law. While acknowledging that the context in which the child was being raised was a relevant
factor, the Supreme Court concluded that Hedigan J. had overemphasised the position of the lesbian
couple at the expense of considerations relating to the child's right to a relationship with his father.
Although reiterating that the father had no constitutional rights in respect of his child, (and no
Convention rights given that his role was confined to that of a sperm donor82 ) the court nonetheless
ruled that the child had a right to contact with his father.
The High Court's reliance on the European Convention on Human Rights was, the Supreme Court
concluded, ultimately misguided. Article 8 of the Convention requires the State party to respect
(among other things) the right to family life. In this context, the concept of family life is given a wide,
organic meaning, based on the quality of family relationships, rather than the form that they take.
Thus, provided there is evidence of family ties, the court will recognise a wide diversity of
relationships, including that between an unmarried mother and child,83 an estranged father and his
child,84 an unmarried father and his child,85 and a cohabiting couple and their child.86 The emphasis
*Irish Jurist 218 in Convention jurisprudence is on the quality of the relationship, and the extent of
family ties forged between the parties. For instance, a genetic link on its own may not be sufficient to
give rise to recognised family ties,87 although, if a parent has taken an interest in his or her child (even
if there had been no cohabitation), family life may be established.88
Nonetheless, as ECHR jurisprudence stood at that time, a lesbian couple and their child were not
treated as a family for the purpose of art.8, Hedigan J. having effectively (as Fennelly J. indicated)
“outpace[d] Strasbourg” in so ruling.89 This was certainly true at the time, though, as since the
Supreme Court verdict, ECHR jurisprudence has progressed to recognise same-sex couples as being
encompassed by the “family life” protected by art.8.90 Yet, even if ECHR jurisprudence had at that
point recognised same-sex couples with children as enjoying family rights, the outcome may have
been the same: to the extent that the definition of family in the Convention would bring the Convention
into conflict with the Constitution, the Constitution would, as a matter of domestic law, prevail.91
Furthermore, one may only rely on the Convention in the Irish courts by invoking the specific and
somewhat limited provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. As Doyle and
Feldman have written, the Act “… did not give general effect to the Convention but rather imposed
certain obligations related to the Convention, in certain circumstances”.92 Emphasising the dualist
nature of Irish law, Murray C.J. (in the Supreme Court) noted that the Convention could be applied in
Irish law only to the extent permitted by the Act itself. In the High Court, Hedigan J. had erroneously
applied the Convention as if it was itself directly part of Irish law, a stance not permitted by the Act.93
*Irish Jurist 219 As regards the definition of family, Murray C.J. cautioned that the silence of the
Constitution as regards non-marital families did not mean that the Constitution was neutral as regards
such families.94 The court reiterated that, in so far as the Constitution is concerned, the family
recognised in Irish law is the marital family. As Denham J. noted, “… arising from the terms of the
Constitution, ‘family’ means a family based on marriage, the marriage of a man and a woman”.95
“There is”, she added:
“… no institution in Ireland of a de facto family. Reference has been made in cases previously, as set
out earlier in this judgment, to a de facto family, but it is a shorthand method of referring to the
circumstances of a settled relationship in which a child lives.”96
Geoghegan J. agreed, adding that he found “nothing wrong with the rather useful expression ‘de facto
family’ provided it is not regarded as a legal term or given a legal connotation. But as the Latin makes
clear it connotes merely a factual situation and not a legal concept.” 97 Fennelly J. also concurred,
noting: “Neither the Constitution nor the law in force in Ireland recognise persons in the position of the
respondents as constituting a family with the natural child of one of them.”98
RECOGNISING THE “LIVED REALITY”
In certain respects these dicta appear to go beyond what has been stated to date. While earlier
judgments focus on the constitutional definition of family, some of the dicta in McD v L appear to
suggest that, in Irish law generally, the “family” is similarly confined. The judges, however, may simply
have been describing the reality of Irish law as it stood at that time rather than precluding legislative
reform. Fennelly J., for instance, hints at the possibility of legislative reform conferring rights on
non-traditional families, noting that:
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*Irish Jurist 220 “None of the foregoing means that the present legal situation will continue unaltered
at either international or national level. National legislation may address these difficult problems.
Changes in the Strasbourg jurisprudence are to be expected.”99
Likewise in JMcB v LE 100 MacMenamin J., while affirming that a de facto family was not legally a
“family” for the purpose of Irish law, observed that:
“In the national legal order, the identification of this constitutional line of demarcation does not, of
course, operate as a complete bar to recognition of long term relationships outside marriage.”101
This seems to leave the door open to legislative changes that may enhance the position of the de
facto family. Indeed, in several respects McD v L, while refusing emphatically to regard the lesbian
couple as a family for the purpose of Irish law, nonetheless indicates that both the courts and the
legislature are entitled to have regard to the “lived reality” in which a child is being raised. In
particular, all of the judges in McD acknowledged that the environment in which the child was being
raised was a factor to which the court should attach some weight. In the course of his judgment,
Murray C.J. observed that although the couple was not a family for the purpose of Irish law,
“… that is not to say that the de facto position of BM [the mother's partner] could or should be totally
ignored in considering the issues in this case since so much turns on the ultimate interests of the
child. BM's relationship with PL [the mother] and their relationship with the child are among the factors
to be taken into account in that context.”102
He went on to note that the situation of persons other than the natural parent of a child--including
grandparents and foster parents--and in particular the relationship between those persons and the
child, was a “material factor in determining the custody and associated rights of the child”.103
At several junctures, Denham J. (as she then was) also emphasised the relevance of the settled and
loving environment in which the child was being raised. Indeed, despite the emphatic conclusion that
the couple and child were not a family, Denham J. suggests that Hedigan J.'s error on this point had
“little significant effect on the analysis in the circumstances of this case of what is in the best interests
of the child”.104 Indeed, Denham J. suggests that the de facto situation was an important factor to be
given weight in this context:
*Irish Jurist 221 “… the circumstances of the case show that the respondents have lived together for
years in a loving relationship and that they provide a settled and loving home for the child. These
factors are critical and of importance in assessing the welfare of the child.”105
Denham J. (though concluding that Hedigan J. had placed excessive emphasis on this factor) thus
attached “significant weight” to the “loving environment” in which the child was being raised.106 Murray
C.J. and Geoghegan J. both agreed that while the family in which the child was being raised did not
enjoy constitutional or Convention rights, the factual context of the child's upbringing is one of the
factors to be considered in assessing what conclusion is in the best interests of the child. The verdict
indeed reflects this, the court agreeing that the father should not be awarded guardianship.
The decision thus presents a rather equivocal, nuanced picture. For one, while precluding recognition
of the couple and child as a family, it does not close the door to considerations of the “lived reality” of
the child's life. The case emphasises at several junctures the disempowered position of the mother's
partner,107 but nonetheless acknowledges the value to the child of the loving environment in which the
mother and her partner were raising the child. Thus, despite the emphatic rejection of the suggestion
that the family as an entity was entitled to recognition under either the Constitution or the Convention,
the Supreme Court nonetheless did have regard to the de facto “lived reality” of the child's upbringing.
A policy of judicial deference
The tenor of these comments appears to suggest that while neither the court nor the legislature may
redefine the constitutional meaning of family, this does not preclude legislative recognition of
parenting arrangements not based on marriage. Indeed, in this regard, as elsewhere, the courts will
more than likely be inclined to defer to the legislature when it comes to matters of social policy. The
Supreme Court has regularly acknowledged that matters of social and economic policy are peculiarly
within the province of the legislature, and that they will be slow to intervene where the Oireachtas
enacts legislation to address particular social issues in accordance with its preferred policy.108 *Irish
Jurist 222 For instance, in MD (A minor) v Ireland, 109 the Supreme Court examined an exemption
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from age of consent laws that meant that where an underage girl has sexual intercourse with an
underage boy (the age of consent being 17) the boy may be prosecuted,110 but the girl may not.111 A
challenge based on the constitutional guarantee of equality and the right to a fair trial failed. Speaking
for the court Denham C.J. reasoned that the framing of sexual offences legislation involved difficult
social policy choices and that “[t]he fundamental constitutional question is whether it falls to the Court
or to the Oireachtas to make the judgment as to whether the risk that the female will become
pregnant justifies exempting her, but not her male counterpart, from prosecution”.112 This was, she
concluded, a matter within the particular province of the Oireachtas: “decisions on matters of such
social sensitivity and difficulty are in essence a matter for the legislature. Courts should be deferential
to the legislative view on such matters of social policy.”113
The decision of Dunne J. in Zappone and Gilligan v Revenue Commissioners 114 supports the view
that in the context of recognition of same-sex couples, at least, the courts may be inclined to defer to
the Oireachtas, though to what extent is unclear. That decision confirms that a foreign same-sex
marriage is not recognised as a marriage in Irish law.115 Adopting an historical approach to the
interpretation of the Constitution, Dunne J. concluded that the term “marriage” as used in the
Constitution (as well as in legislation and at common law) meant a heterosexual marriage and did not
support the plaintiffs' contention for a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. The general
understanding of marriage had not, she added, changed in the intervening years since 1937 to allow
an “updated” construction of the term “marriage”. Indeed aspects of Dunne J.'s judgment appear to
suggest that, although certain constitutional rights, particularly unenumerated rights, may be
interpreted in a dynamic manner in line with changing values, the meaning of the term “marriage”
could not be: the historical constitutional understanding of marriage as a *Irish Jurist 223
heterosexual union was fixed. This appears to intimate--though the point is unclear--that the
introduction of same-sex marriage in Ireland might possibly require a referendum so as to change the
constitutional understanding of the meaning of marriage. Certainly, the judgment reveals a significant
unease with the proposition that the constitutional understanding of marriage could be redefined
judicially. Notably, Denham J. in JMcD v PL and BM 116 remarked (albeit obiter) that “arising from the
terms of the Constitution, ‘family’ means a family based on marriage, the marriage of a man and a
woman”.117 Later in the same judgment she reiterates this point, noting that “[u]nder the Constitution it
has been clearly established that the family in Irish law is based on a marriage between a man and a
woman”.118 Certainly, an argument could be made that so far-reaching a change to the longstanding
understanding of marriage would require popular endorsement from the people in a referendum.
On the other hand, Carolan, Tobin, O'Mahony119 and Daly120 have all cogently argued that there is no
constitutional impediment to same-sex marriage. O'Mahony, for instance, notes the pronounced
tendency of the Irish superior courts to defer to the legislature on matters of “intense political
controversy”,121 viewing the Oireachtas as the more democratically legitimate forum in which to
address law reform. O'Mahony thus concludes “that while the vague provisions of Articles 40 and 41
of the Constitution do not guarantee same-sex marriage, they equally do not preclude it--the choice is
a matter for the Oireachtas, which is free to reflect changing consensus in society by legislating for
same-sex marriage without a referendum”. Notably, Dunne J. in Zappone references the passage by
the Oireachtas of the Civil Registration Act 2004 (which prevents marriages between two people of
the same sex from being solemnised) in support of her view that there was no social consensus in
favour of same-sex marriage at that time. This reference to the legislature may imply that, should the
legislature change its mind on the point, the courts would likely defer to its will. Dunne J.'s verdict
could thus be read simply as reflecting a judicial reluctance to redefine marriage rather than imposing
a legislative bar in relation to the definition.
The decision does suggest that it would be open to the legislature to address the particular position of
same-sex couples through legislation. Addressing the *Irish Jurist 224 denial of legal recognition in
cases of death or illness of a same-sex partner, Dunne J. indicated that it was within the power of the
legislature to address the issue:
“… It is to be hoped that the legislative changes to ameliorate these difficulties will not be long in
coming. Ultimately, it is for the legislature to determine the extent to which such changes should be
made.”122
It is unclear whether this means that the Oireachtas may redefine marriage to include same-sex
couples. The judge's earlier conclusion, that the constitutional understanding of marriage is confined
to heterosexual marriage, might suggest that her comments were directed to some form of civil
partnership rather than marriage, although the point is unclear.123 Certainly, the prevailing view among
governments past and present appears to be that a constitutional amendment is required in order to
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introduce same-sex marriage, although, as O'Mahony and Daly have observed, this view may be
erroneous. Yet, whatever about marriage, the decision certainly suggests that it is constitutionally
open to the legislature to pass civil partnership legislation to address the particular situation of
same-sex couples, and that the courts would defer to the legislature as regards the social policy
choices made in that context.
De facto recognition of de facto families
Indeed, despite the stance of the Constitution, both the courts and the legislature have recognised
relationships not founded on marriage, albeit not in the context of Art.41. The Supreme Court has
confirmed, for instance, that children born outside marriage have personal constitutional rights
equivalent to those of children born within marriage.124 Though this does not (as O'B v S 125 illustrates)
preclude legislative discrimination against non-marital children, it does offer some constitutional
foothold for children born outside marriage. The legislature has also proved amenable to the child
born outside marriage, the Status of Children Act 1987 having removed the status of illegitimacy from
the statute books, and in most respects has equalised the legal position of marital and non-marital
children. The Government, moreover, proposes in 2012 to seek an amendment of the Constitution
that, inter alia, would confer enhanced constitutional rights on children, on an equal footing and
regardless of the marital status of a child's parents.
In State (Nicolaou) v An Bord Uchtála 126 the Supreme Court observed that the mother of a child born
outside marriage has constitutional rights under Art.40.3 in respect of her child. In G v An Bord
Uchtála 127 three Supreme *Irish Jurist 225 Court judges (though on different sides of the ultimate
outcome) agreed that this was the case.128 Unmarried fathers129 have fared less well. The courts have
consistently confirmed that non-marital fathers have no constitutional rights either to custody or
guardianship in respect of their children.130 This results in a curious situation. While the mother of a
child born inside marriage has heavily entrenched rights, these must be shared on an equal footing
with her husband, Tilson v Attorney General 131 having confirmed that husbands and wives have
equal decision-making rights in respect of their children.132 The mother of a child born outside
marriage, however, while enjoying somewhat less entrenched constitutional rights in respect of her
child,133 has potentially more autonomy, not having to share her constitutional position with the father.
By contrast with the position of the marital father, the unmarried father's role constitutionally is
emphatically subordinate to that of the child's mother.
That said, legislation confers on all unmarried fathers a right to apply for custody and access.134 The
position of the non-marital father has gradually been improved, though automatic guardianship for
non-marital fathers (as twice recommended by the Law Reform Commission)135 remains elusive. The
Status of Children Act 1987 extended a right to unmarried fathers to apply for guardianship. This new
provision--contained in s.6A of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964--does not confer an automatic
right of guardianship on the father. Whether guardianship will be granted depends primarily on what
would be in the best interests of the child.136 Since 1997, it has also been possible for *Irish Jurist
226 a father to share joint guardianship with the mother of a non-marital child on foot of a statutory
declaration signed by both father and mother.137
In determining applications for guardianship, the courts, in practice, have regard to the context into
which the child was born. In particular, the courts have stipulated that where the child was born to
parties in a committed cohabiting relationship, this will militate in the non-marital father's favour. In JK
v VW 138 the Supreme Court confirmed that, under s.6A, an unmarried father had only the right to
apply for guardianship, and no guarantee of success in that context.139 The primary consideration in
determining such applications was whether it would be “desirable for the child to enjoy the society,
protection and guardianship of its father, even though its father and mother are not married”. The
court, in making its determination, may look to the blood link between father and child, though this will
not in itself be decisive.140 The outcome will depend significantly on the level of involvement and
interest the father has had in his child's life. The court confirmed that the unmarried father has rights
of interests and concern (though not constitutional in character) but the extent of these rights in any
given case depended on the particular circumstances. As Finlay C.J. observed:
“The extent and character of the rights which accrue arising from the relationship of a father to a child
to whose mother he is not married must vary very greatly indeed, depending on the circumstances of
each individual case. The range of variation would, I am satisfied, extend from the situation of the
father of a child conceived as a result of casual intercourse, where the rights might well be so minimal
as practically to be non-existent, to the situation of a child born as the result of a stable and
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established relationship and nurtured at the commencement of his life by his father and mother in a
situation bearing nearly all of the characteristics of a constitutionally protected family, when the rights
would be very extensive indeed.”141
*Irish Jurist 227 Thus, where the child had been born to parents in a stable relationship, the weight
to be attached to the father's position may be very extensive indeed. By contrast, where the father
had not had any involvement beyond his role in the conception of the child, the position of the father
would be much weaker.
This approach was followed by the Supreme Court in WO'R v EH 142 In his ruling, Hamilton C.J.
confirmed the principles set out in JK v VW and reiterated that the father's prospects of being granted
guardianship might be enhanced where the child was born into a stable family unit:
“… where the children are born as a result of a stable and established relationship and nurtured at the
commencement of life by father and mother in a de facto family as opposed to a constitutional family,
then the natural father, on application to the Court under s.6A of the Guardianship of Infants Act,
1964, has extensive rights of interest and concern. However, they are subordinate to the paramount
concern of the court which is the welfare of the children.”143
This suggests that a father with strong ties to his child may have good prospects of success in making
an application. What both cases suggest is that despite the rhetoric of non-recognition, the courts in
practice will look to the quality of de facto relationships outside marriage and that the quality of these
relationships is in fact relevant in practice. In WO'R v EH Hamilton C.J. intimated that although the
courts could not confer constitutional recognition on non-marital de facto families, this did not mean
that the courts were required to ignore the existence of such unions. He noted that in the earlier
decision of JK v VW the Supreme Court had “recognised the existence of 'de facto families' and also
the fact that a natural father who lived in such a family might have extensive rights of interest and
concern …”.144 Murphy J. in WO'R also noted:
“For better or for worse, it is clearly the fact that long-term relationships having many of the
characteristics of a family based on marriage have become commonplace. Relationships which would
have been the cause of grave embarrassment a generation ago are now widely accepted.”145
*Irish Jurist 228 This is not to say that the absence of a relationship between the parents will be
fatal to the father's case. While the judges in McD v L cited with apparent approval the principles set
out in JK and WO'R, the Supreme Court found in the father's favour in relation to access.
Nonetheless, the case law suggests that in practice the courts do take account of the de facto living
arrangements of the parents. This gives rise to something of a paradox: while such families are
denied constitutional status, the courts in practice will look more favourably on the father where the
child is born as a result of “a stable and established relationship”. In other words, despite the official
line, the courts are willing to have regard to non-traditional relationships.
NON-MARITAL COUPLES AND THE CONSTITUTION
The legal position of non-marital couples inter se prior to 2011 was fairly stark. Outside very specific
and narrow contexts, cohabiting non-marital couples were not recognised as such in law and
inhabited largely the same legal territory as flatmates.146 For instance, non-marital couples enjoyed no
protection on a partner's intestacy, while former partners could not claim maintenance from each
other, in their own right.147 For certain limited purposes--such as domestic violence,148 compensation
for wrongful death149 and automatic succession to residential tenancies150 --non-marital couples were
recognised, though often subject to minimum co-residence requirements and other restrictions.
Notably, the gendered wording of these measures implicitly appeared to exclude same-sex couples.
For instance, while couples cohabiting outside marriage were recognised for the purpose of most
social welfare entitlements, recognition was, prior to 2011, confined to opposite-sex couples151 (a
stance that often worked to the benefit of same-sex couples, given that recognition of cohabitation
can in some cases result in reduced social welfare payments and denial of access to others).
Likewise, provisions conferring recognition on non-marital couples in the context of domestic violence,
wrongful death and residential tenancy rights seemed to be worded in such a way as to require an
opposition of gender.152
*Irish Jurist 229 The enactment of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of
Cohabitants Act 2010 has significantly changed the situation of non-marital couples. The bulk of the
Act creates a substantial new legal status, called civil partnership, for same-sex couples who register
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their relationships in accordance with the Act. Cohabitants, both same-sex and opposite sex, who are
not married or in a civil partnership are automatically conferred with limited rights by Pt 15 of the Act,
while long-term cohabitants, called qualified cohabitants, have enhanced rights and remedies in
cases where a relationship ends, either by death or otherwise, though subject to conditions and some
limitations.
It will be immediately apparent that these measures confer legal rights--in the case of civil
partnership, very extensive rights--that formerly were confined exclusively to families based on
marriage. The question arises whether these steps conform to the constitutional position that
privileges marriage. Although the Constitution does not recognise the family based outside marriage,
that is not to say that the legislature is necessarily precluded from conferring rights and obligations on
persons in non-traditional family units. It is certainly clear from O'B v S 153 that measures that treat
members of the marital family more favourably than those of the non-marital family may be justified by
the constitutional preference for marriage. This does not mean, however, that the legislature cannot
legislate for the children of non-marital unions. In O'B v S Walsh J. noted that “… the decision to
change the existing rules of intestate succession and the extent to which they are to be changed are
primarily matters for the Oireachtas”,154 a statement that appears tentatively to suggest that the courts
will likely defer to the Oireachtas in relation to such matters.155 In Nicolaou, the same judge had
observed that:
“An illegitimate child has the same natural rights as a legitimate child though not necessarily the same
legal rights. Legal rights as distinct from natural rights are determined by the law for the time being in
force in the State. While the law cannot under the Constitution seek to deprive the illegitimate child of
those natural rights guaranteed by the Constitution it *Irish Jurist 230 can, as in the Adoption Act,
1952, secure for the illegitimate child legal rights similar to those possessed by legitimate children.”156
Both statements seem to suggest that while the State was not obliged to treat non-marital children the
same as marital children, it is probably not unconstitutional for the legislature to treat marital children
the same as non-marital.
It is correspondingly clear from Murphy v Attorney General 157 that the State cannot generally favour
unmarried couples over married. In that case taxation measures that potentially placed a higher tax
burden on double-income married couples than on their similarly placed unmarried counterparts were
found to be in breach of the Constitution. The rationale for this decision, as explained by Finlay C.J. in
Muckley v Ireland, 158 was that the tax code had penalised married couples for being married, and had
thus failed to “guard with special care the institution of marriage” as required by Art.41.3.1°.159 The
Supreme Court in Muckley rejected the suggestion that measures would be unconstitutional only if
they induced people who might otherwise marry not to do so.160 This appears to support the view that
measures that recognise unions outside marriage may be constitutional provided that married couples
are not penalised or treated less favourably as a result of such measures, even if they do not
dissuade couples from marrying.
The decision in MhicMhathúna v Ireland 161 suggests a somewhat different though reconcilable
approach. In this case, the plaintiffs challenged taxation and social welfare measures that favoured
lone parents and in particular unmarried mothers parenting alone. They claimed that these measures
discriminated against intact married couples and thus constituted an attack upon the institution of
marriage contrary to Art.41.3.1°. In her High Court decision, Carroll J. appeared to entertain the
argument that measures that favoured non-marital unions might be unconstitutional if they provided
an inducement not to marry, though in this particular case she rejected the suggestion that such an
inducement existed. Noting the particular financial and practical challenges facing persons parenting
alone, Carroll J. concluded that the measures in question did not constitute an attack on the institution
of marriage. She rejected the proposition that the measures in question might induce a person who
was otherwise minded to marry not to do so, or that they would encourage births outside marriage,
concluding that the measures constituted a policy response to the very particular financial strains
faced by one-parent families. She noted, in particular, that the extra support provided was
“child-centred” and directed to alleviating the extra burden involved in *Irish Jurist 231 parenting
alone. The Supreme Court on appeal upheld this verdict, approving Carroll J.'s reasoning.162 Her
decision suggests that the courts may still be willing to consider a measure unconstitutional if it
induces a party not to marry, though a reading of MhicMhathúna alongside Murphy and Muckley
would suggest that the absence of an inducement not to marry does not necessarily render the
legislation constitutional if it otherwise penalises the married state.163
Doyle cautions against too readily extrapolating general principles relating to systematic partnership
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recognition from cases that did not address such schemes.164 Nevertheless, neither of these
decisions would appear to preclude the extension of selected marriage-like rights to non-marital
couples. In summary, provided that the legislation in question did not grant more favourable rights to
unmarried couples to the point where married couples were penalised for being married, or, as an
alternative, did not provide an “inducement” not to marry, the legislation will likely be constitutional.
This point is discussed further below in relation to civil partnership.
The High Court decision in Ennis v Butterly, 165 however, suggests a more stringent approach that
may limit the scope for recognition. This case involved a cohabiting couple, both of whom were
married to other people. They had lived together for over eight years before their relationship ended.
The plaintiff claimed that, during their relationship, the defendant had promised to support her for life.
She sought damages for breach of this promise. Kelly J. concluded, however, that even if such a
promise had been made, it was unenforceable. To enforce such an agreement would, he concluded,
equate cohabitation with marriage, giving the agreement “a similar status in law as a marital contract”.
166 Kelly J. found support for his conclusion in the fact that the legislature at that time had not seen fit
to impose a mutual obligation of support on cohabitants. He added that in taking this stance the
legislature “accepts that it would be contrary to public policy, as enunciated in the Constitution, to
confer legal rights on persons in non-marital unions that are akin to [the rights of] those who are
married”.167 In coming to this conclusion, Kelly J. placed a heavy emphasis on the constitutionally
privileged position of marriage, suggesting that the terms of Art.41.3 leaned heavily against the
enforcement of cohabitation agreements.
“Given the special place of marriage and the family under the Irish Constitution, it appears to me that
the public policy of this State ordains that non-marital cohabitation does not and cannot have the
*Irish Jurist 232 same constitutional status as marriage. Moreover, the State has pledged to guard
with special care the institution of marriage. But does this mean that agreements, the consideration
for which is cohabitation, are incapable of being enforced? In my view it does since otherwise the
pledge on the part of the State, of which this Court is one organ, to guard with special care the
institution of marriage would be much diluted. To permit an express cohabitation contract (such as is
pleaded here) to be enforced would give it a similar status in law as a marriage contract.”168
While granting legal recognition to non-marital couples would not of itself alter the constitutional status
of such unions, the overall impression conveyed by the judgment is that constitutional policy and
public policy are intimately linked, such that recognition of non-marital unions may of itself infringe the
Constitution, even if it neither penalises married couples nor induces couples away from marriage.
This seems, however--as Doyle has suggested--to conflate extending constitutional rights to
non-marital couples (which is not permitted) with conferring legal rights thereon.169 Earlier judgments,
such as Nicolaou, suggest that the courts were concerned with confining constitutional rights under
Art.41 to the marital family, and were not necessarily ruling out conferring legal rights by legislation.
The question that thus arises is whether and to what extent the three new statuses conferred by the
Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”) would
stand up to constitutional scrutiny. At what point would equating the rights of non-marital couples with
those of marital couples infringe the Constitution? Given that marriage is afforded a privileged position
in the Constitution, it is arguable that a direct and generally applicable equation between marriage
and non-marital unions--to the point where it made no difference whether a person was married or
not--would likely infringe the special position of marriage, particularly if it applied to heterosexuals.
However, the argument is less easily made in the context of same-sex couples, to whom we now turn.
CIVIL PARTNERSHIP170
The introduction of civil partnership is a most remarkable development in Irish law. It is of course not
unique to Ireland but reflects instead a now significant trend in western democracies in favour of
affording legal recognition to same- *Irish Jurist 233 sex couples. What is perhaps most remarkable
in the Irish context is that the adoption of so comprehensive a civil partnership regime has come a
mere 17 years after the decriminalisation of male homosexual acts.171 It arrives also in a context
where, prior to its enactment, unmarried couples, and particularly same-sex couples, had next to no
legal rights or obligations in respect of their relationships.172
Civil partnership is closely modelled on marriage. Many of the provisions of the 2010 Act either
replicate similar provisions applying to spouses173 or amend existing legislation so as to extend to civil
partners rights and responsibilities previously conferred only on spouses.174 While there are certainly
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differences, some quite crucial, it is hard to escape the conclusion, looking at civil partnership, that
the intention of the legislature was to equate civil partnership as closely as was politically and
constitutionally possible to marriage. Like marriage, it is an exclusive union,175 potentially for life,
though subject to dissolution. It is open only to adults aged 18 or over176 (though unlike marriage, no
provision is made for exceptions to the minimum age requirement) who are not closely related to each
other.177 Although it is not confined to gay or bisexual persons, the parties must be of the same sex,
though the implication of the consanguinity bar is that it is envisaged primarily as a relationship
formed through romantic attraction rather than any pre-existing family relationship.
From a constitutional perspective, the confinement of civil partnership to same-sex couples is quite
deliberate. If the charge were to be laid that civil partnership undermines the institution of marriage,
the first line of defence might well be that it is quintessentially aimed at those couples who are not
able to marry each other. Thus, no couple who might otherwise marry is being dissuaded from
marriage in favour of civil partnership.178 The charge might *Irish Jurist 234 be levelled that such
persons might marry people of the opposite sex if civil partnership were not available, though this is
not likely; even if it were, it is arguably not conducive to the integrity of marriage or the well-being of
married people that gay or lesbian people should be encouraged into life-long heterosexual unions.179
The 2010 Act does not create--in civil partnership at least--a rival to marriage, given that it applies
only to couples who cannot marry. It could hardly be argued that civil partnership “penalises” married
couples in the sense envisaged in Murphy and Muckley. The 2010 Act does not affect or diminish the
rights of married couples. In fact, at several junctures great care is taken to ensure that the rights of
new spouses of former civil partners are preserved notwithstanding the enactment of civil partnership.
180 Nor could it be said that civil partnership dissuades couples who might marry from so doing (the
inducement argument posited in MhicMhathúna), as same-sex couples cannot marry. Even
hypothetically, the inception of civil partnership is unlikely to steer those otherwise inclined to a
heterosexual marriage to opt for civil partnership with a person of the same sex.
By contrast, John Mee argues that full or even limited civil partnership for opposite-sex couples would
more than likely have been unconstitutional.181 Civil partnership for opposite-sex couples would
inevitably create a parallel system of relationship recognition that would draw opposite-sex couples,
who might otherwise marry, away from marriage. Even a limited form of opposite-sex civil partnership
would, he concludes, more than likely be found unconstitutional on the basis that couples might be
attracted away from marriage by the less rigorous obligations associated with such unions. Mee
argues that, given the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, such contentions cannot be
made in respect of a regime of civil partnership confined to those of the same gender. Mee does
countenance the situation of bisexual persons “whose sexual preferences make it possible for them to
have a committed relationship with someone of either sex”, hypothesising that civil partnership might
remove the incentive to marry in such cases.182 He concludes however that:
*Irish Jurist 235 “… it does not seem that the institution of marriage is benefited if the fiscal and
other societal benefits associated with marriage induce a person to marry someone other than (and of
a different gender to) the person to whom he or she would otherwise have committed himself or
herself.”183
Indeed, he suggests that the institution of marriage is potentially “harmed by the painful breakdown of
opposite sex marriages where one of the parties is homosexual and would not have entered into the
marriage if society had been willing to recognise same-sex civil partnership”.184 On that basis, Mee
surmises that civil partnership, if confined to same-sex partners, would likely be upheld as
constitutional.
Marriage's (non-identical) twin
The similarities between marriage and civil partnership are striking. The process for entering into a
civil partnership is overwhelmingly the same as for the solemnisation of a marriage, the main
exception being that religious ministers may not officiate at a civil partnership.185 The rules and
procedures for seeking maintenance are identical save that a person cannot be compelled to support
a child of his or her civil partner.186 (A step-parent--the spouse of a parent--may by contrast be obliged
to support his spouse's child if, knowing he is not the parent of the child, he accepts the child as a
child of the family.)187 For the purpose of succession law, civil partners and spouses are largely
treated identically, although the child of a civil partner is in a slightly stronger position vis-à-vis his
parent's estate.188 Likewise, the remedies available on dissolution, *Irish Jurist 236 and the criteria
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for granting such remedies,189 are largely identical in the case of divorce and civil partnership
dissolution, the key exception being that civil partnership dissolution does not require or facilitate
provision for children by the civil partner of a parent.190
Taxation rules and social welfare law have also been amended such that civil partners and spouses
are now treated alike for these purposes.191 Likewise, civil partners of Irish citizens are now treated
the same as spouses of Irish citizens for the purpose of obtaining citizenship,192 while in practice,
government policy ordains that civil partners be treated the same as spouses in the context of
immigration.193 Spouses and civil partners have identical rights in the context of domestic violence,194
and are treated the same as spouses for an extensive variety of legal purposes, the 2010 Act altering
a multitude of separate pieces of legislation so as to equate the position of spouses and civil partners.
In the context of pensions, civil partners must be treated the same as spouses,195 while changes to
the Employment Equality Act 1998 and the Equal Status Act 2000 require that persons not be
discriminated against in the context of employment and the supply of goods and services,
accommodation and education on the basis that they are or were civil partners.196
Not a “family”
Provisions similar to those of the Family Home Protection Act 1976 have been applied to civil partners
on a like basis,197 though in deference to the Constitution the term “shared home” is used in
preference to “family home” where civil partners are concerned. Indeed, despite the extensive rights
conferred on civil partners, throughout the 2010 Act a studious effort has been made generally to
avoid the use of the term “family” as a description for civil partners (one isolated exception being in
the context of employment equality, where “member of a family” is redefined to include civil partners).
198 This is undoubtedly a consequence of the confinement of family in the Constitution *Irish Jurist
237 to the family based on marriage. The use of “shared home” is probably the most obvious
example, though there are other instances where the 2010 Act deliberately avoids redefining the term
“family” to describe civil partners. Another example is provided by the amendment of the Non-Fatal
Offences Against the Person Act 1997,199 which addresses certain conduct directed against members
of a person's family.200 For these purposes “member of the family” is defined widely, and includes
children (marital and non-marital), parents and step-parents, grandparents and grandchildren, siblings
and half-siblings, uncles, aunts, nephews and nieces. Notably it also includes “any person cohabiting
or residing with” the person. Yet, instead of including civil partners within the definition of “members of
the family” of the person, the 2010 Act simply added a separate reference to civil partners in each of
the relevant sections. While the net effect is the same, the implication is that civil partners are not
family members but in a category sui generis.201 This is all the more bizarre given the already very
extensive definition of family members; peculiarly, a same-sex cohabitant would be treated as a
family member under this section, but not a civil partner. A similar approach is generally taken to the
word “relative”, the overall picture being that despite the new status conferred by the 2010 Act, civil
partnership does not confer the status of “relative” on a person in respect of her civil partner's family
members.202
Given the decision of the Supreme Court in Jordan v O'Brien 203 this may be an overly restrictive
approach. In that case, the Supreme Court, overturning the earlier dictum of Murnaghan J. in
McCombe v Sheehan, 204 concluded that the term “family”, when used in legislation, did not
necessarily have to bear the same meaning as it did in the Constitution.
“It seems to me that Mr. Justice Murnaghan may have been correct in saying, as he did in
McCombe's Case, that ‘family’ in Article 41 of the Constitution means ‘parents and children’: but
where a word has a number of recognised meanings the use of it in one such meaning in the
Constitution does not seem to me to warrant any presumption that the same meaning is to be given to
it in a statute which is not in pari materia.” 205
*Irish Jurist 238 This appears to suggest that the Oireachtas may have been overly cautious in its
approach in the 2010 Act. That said, there may certainly be a substantive difference between treating
persons as members of each other's family for certain limited purposes as opposed to situations
where a statute confers an extensive family status generally on unmarried persons. While isolated
recognition may be constitutionally sound, greater caution may be required with a measure generally
conferring extensive rights and obligations.
Children
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The main gap in legislative provision in the 2010 Act relates to the position of children being raised by
civil partners.206 The main difficulty is that the 2010 Act provides no mechanism to secure legal rights
and impose obligations in respect of the child on the civil partner who is not a biological parent of the
child. Although the 2010 Act does reference children in some contexts,207 the overwhelming tendency
of the 2010 Act is to ring-fence the civil partners and to ignore the legal position of children being
raised by civil partners. Civil partnership dissolution, for instance, may be granted without reference to
the needs of children,208 though crucially, in granting maintenance and remedies post-dissolution, the
court must have regard to the obligations of each civil partner towards his or her biological or adoptive
children.209 Consent to a disposition of the shared home may also, in theory, be dispensed with by a
court without having regard to the needs of children.210
Civil partners, moreover, cannot jointly adopt a child, even a biological child of one of the civil
partners. Nor is there any mechanism allowing the biological parent to share guardianship rights with
his or her civil partner (though the Law Reform Commission has recommended allowing the spouses
and civil partners of parents to acquire shared guardianship, either by court order or by agreement
with existing guardians).211 While a person may seek access in respect of his or her civil partner's
child where the person has been in loco parentis in respect of the child,212 he or she has no express
right to seek custody. The non-biological parent, moreover, cannot be obliged to maintain the child,
while the child has no right to succeed to or claim any part of the estate of a parent's civil partner on
the latter's death, unless expressly provided for by will.
In certain respects, the civil partner is in the same position as a step-parent (a step-parent does not,
by marrying the parent of a child, thereby acquire *Irish Jurist 239 parental rights) though two
significant differences apply. First, a spouse of a parent may, together with the parent, jointly adopt a
child, providing a facility whereby the couple may share guardianship of a child of one of the parties.
213 Secondly, a spouse of a parent (who is not herself a parent of the child) may be obliged to support
the child if, knowing that she is not a parent of the child, treats the child as a child of the family.214 By
contrast, even where a person, A, consciously agrees to an arrangement whereby her civil partner, B,
becomes pregnant, A cannot be obliged to maintain that child.
It is unclear to what extent such differentiation is constitutionally required. Given that the legislature
has extended the right to seek guardianship to unmarried fathers, the constitutional preference for
marriage could hardly be said to require non-recognition of the social parent. Certainly, some care is
required to ensure that any recognition of the parent's civil partner is not at the expense of a party
with constitutional rights to guardianship, such as a mother or marital father. None of this, however,
would appear to preclude recognition of social parenthood, subject to the preservation of existing
rights, particularly where the child has been born outside marriage. Indeed, the Minister for Justice
and Equality has conceded that reform in this area is required, and has promised to introduce
legislation addressing the legal relationship between children and the civil partners of their parents.215
Dissolution and other remedies
Outside the context of parenting, the differences between civil partnership and marriage are generally
quite minor, though they are underpinned in some cases by a distinct unease about the constitutional
status of civil partnership. Indeed, it is arguable that at least some of the differences between civil
partnership and marriage were deliberately included to provide a firewall against constitutional
challenge.
Notably, the rights conferred on engaged couples by the Family Law Act 1981 have not been
extended to same-sex couples contemplating civil partnership. Likewise, various common law rights,
such as the right to sue for loss of consortium and the marital privilege, have not been applied to civil
*Irish Jurist 240 partners. The most notable difference, however, applies to dissolution. While both
civil partnership and marriage may be dissolved without establishing fault, the grounds for dissolution
are notably less stringent for civil partners than for spouses. A marriage may be dissolved only where
the couple have been living apart from each other for four of the previous five years and where there
is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation.216 As a precondition to divorce, the Constitution requires,
moreover, that proper provision is made for both spouses and for any children of either or both of
them.217 Solicitors for each client, moreover, are required by legislation (as a precondition to applying
for divorce) to advise their clients of the alternatives to litigation and divorce.218
The conditions for civil partnership dissolution219 are significantly less exacting. First, the required
period of living apart for dissolution of a civil partnership--two of the previous three years--is two years
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shorter than the period for divorce. Furthermore, there is no requirement that the parties demonstrate
that there is no reasonable prospect of reconciliation. Nor is there any obligation on a solicitor
advising civil partners to discuss alternatives to litigation. Finally, while proper provision must be made
for each civil partner, there is no requirement that proper provision be made for the children of either
party and no facility allowing a court to impose liability for the child's maintenance on the
non-biological parent.
Thus, while the remedies available on dissolution are largely identical to those available on divorce,
an exit from civil partnership appears much more easily and quickly attainable than a termination of a
marriage. The shorter timeframe for dissolution of a civil partnership may in fact be constitutionally
necessary. John Mee has indicated that the constitutional right to marry may preclude measures that
render it unduly difficult to exit a failed civil partnership where one of the partners wishes to marry a
person of the opposite sex.220 Citing O'Shea v Ireland, 221 where legislation barring a woman from
marrying her ex-husband's brother was declared in breach of the constitutional right to marry, Mee
argues that a measure that unduly delays or fetters a person from entering a marriage following a
failed civil partnership cannot be upheld if not “justified either as being necessary in support of the
constitutional protection of the family and the institution of marriage or having regard to the *Irish
Jurist 241 requirements of the common good”.222 While O'Shea involved a prohibition on remarriage
rather than a delay thereto, Mee suggests that a four-year living apart requirement in the case of civil
partnership dissolution would likely have been unconstitutional as imposing an excessive and
unnecessary restriction upon the right to marry.
Many might argue that the timeframe for civil partnership dissolution is more reasonable than the
constitutionally mandated requirements for divorce. When coupled with the absence of a “no
reasonable prospect of reconciliation” requirement, however, the overall implication is that, while
divorce should be a last resort, granted only when all hope is lost (a stance underpinned by the
constitutional rigour attaching to divorce), civil partnership dissolution is not so great a tragedy and
may be granted more liberally. That said, for many prospective divorcé(e)s, anxious to draw a curtain
over a long-ended marriage, it may reasonably seem that civil partners have the better deal. It is
tempting to suggest that this in fact makes civil partnership more favourable than marriage.
Another notable difference is the absence of provision for judicial separation for civil partners. While
the 2010 Act implicitly indicates that civil partners may enter into binding separation agreements,223
the terms of the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989 remain confined to married
couples.224 This may well reflect the fact that the requirements for dissolution of a civil partnership are
more easily satisfied than for marriage. It is arguable that there would be little benefit in a couple
obtaining a judicial separation if they can dissolve the union after two years' separation. At any rate,
an applicant could seek relief under the maintenance provisions of the 2010 Act while waiting for
dissolution.
Additionally, the grounds for annulment (though similar in many respects to those for marriage) are
somewhat less extensive. The prohibited degrees of relationship for civil partnership, for instance, are
narrower than those that apply to marriage. For the purposes of marriage, the prohibited degrees
*Irish Jurist 242 are based both on consanguinity (addressing blood relatives) and affinity
(concerning persons related through marriage). By contrast, the prohibited degrees in relation to civil
partnership are confined to blood relationships.225 This may reflect a growing disfavour for prohibitions
based on affinity, as illustrated by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in B and L v
United Kingdom, 226 finding that a prohibition on the marriage of a man to his daughter-in-law (unless
both of their former spouses were deceased) infringed the right to marry under art.12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. It may also reflect a concern to emphasise that civil partnership does
not itself create relationships of affinity.
Similarly, the grounds rendering a marriage voidable have not been extended to civil partnership,
namely inability to consummate (logically enough, given that consummation entails an act of
heterosexual intercourse) and inability to form and sustain a normal and caring marital relationship.
Indeed, a notable feature of civil partnership is that the 2010 Act is entirely silent on the sexual
dimension in the partners' relationship. In fact, theoretically, it would appear that two heterosexuals of
the same sex could contract a civil partnership, provided both did so with full informed consent. This
may well reflect the general “retreat from the bedroom” favoured by modern liberal discourses,
signalling that the legislature is not concerned with what consenting adults do in the privacy of their
own homes.227
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Constitutional recognition
From a constitutional perspective, of course, a civil partnership cannot be the foundation of a
constitutional “family”. It is in this regard that civil partnership is most profoundly different from
marriage. However extensive the legal rights conferred on civil partners, civil partners are not
constitutionally protected in their capacity as civil partners. Whatever rights are conferred are enjoyed
by virtue of legislation only. Thus, although same-sex civil partnership may well be constitutionally
sound, this comes at the expense of denying same-sex couples access to the entrenched rights
conferred on families by the Constitution. The implication is that civil partnership could be abolished
without constitutional difficulty. The same could clearly not be said for marriage.
COHABITATION
The creation by Pt 15 of the 2010 Act of the new status of cohabitant, while not as extensive in terms
of rights and obligations as civil partnership, potentially affects a much wider constituency than civil
partnership, potentially as many as 143,000 couples.228 It confers important, if somewhat limited,
rights on this *Irish Jurist 243 wide category. Perhaps more significant than the rights is the status
that it confers. Non-marital couples are recognised as having a definitive legal status that will likely be
a touchstone for future developments.229
The 2010 Act has a further consequence of conferring enhanced rights and obligations on a particular
category of long-term cohabitants called “qualified cohabitants” who may, subject to certain
conditions, seek remedies on the ending of the relationship, whether by death or otherwise.
A “cohabitant”, for the purpose of the 2010 Act, is one of two adults, who are not within the prohibited
degrees of relationship230 and who are living together “in an intimate and committed relationship”.231
The couple may be of the opposite sex or of the same sex.232 The status is conferred automatically,
and does not require (or facilitate) registration. The 2010 Act sets out various criteria for determining
whether a couple are cohabitants,233 though there are undoubtedly grey areas. For one, it may not
always be clear whether a relation-ship--particularly when a couple are experiencing relationship
difficulties--is “intimate and committed”. Although s.172(3) of the 2010 Act clarifies that the absence of
an ongoing sexual relationship does not mean that the couple are no longer cohabitants, the question
may well be asked whether a partner who is having an affair is “committed” to the relationship, or
whether a couple who no longer communicate with each other inhabit an “intimate” relationship. The
rather subjective nature of the definition is compounded when one considers the difficulties that may
arise in determining whether a couple are cohabiting. What would be the case, for instance, if a
couple had separate residences but stayed together at weekends and on holidays?
The definition of “qualified cohabitant” is somewhat more concrete. A couple will be treated as
qualified cohabitants if, at the end of their relationship, they have cohabited together for at least five
years, though the minimum qualifying period is only two years if the couple have one or more
dependent children in common.234 The children need not live with the couple, but both cohabitants
must share biological parenthood of the relevant children. In all cases, however, *Irish Jurist 244 a
couple will be not be treated as qualified cohabitants if either party is married to another person,
unless the married couple have been living apart for four of the previous five years.235 This would
appear to be drafted with the Constitution in mind, the 2010 Act permitting a person to be treated as a
qualified cohabitant only from the point where he or she would be entitled to a divorce. Indeed, even
where parties are treated as qualified cohabitants, the rights of spouses of either party prevail over
those of the qualified cohabitants.236
The rights and obligations of cohabitants per se are not particularly extensive. Indeed, many of the
rights extended to cohabitants replicate several rights already in place for opposite-sex non-marital
cohabitants, though extending them also to same-sex cohabitants. The 2010 Act confers on
cohabitants a right to sue for wrongful death,237 a right to succeed to a residential tenancy on the
death of a cohabitant tenant238 and various remedies for domestic violence.239 Cohabitation is also the
touchstone for determining entitlement to certain social welfare payments.240
Qualified cohabitants have more extensive rights and duties, though nowhere near as comprehensive
as those that apply to civil partners or spouses. Where qualified cohabitants separate, a qualified
cohabitant who is financially dependent on the other qualified cohabitant, where this dependence
“arises from the relationship or the ending of the relationship”, may seek various remedies from the
court against the other qualified cohabitant.241 These remedies (collectively referred to as the “redress
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scheme”) are available only on the ending of the relationship and not while it subsists. The remedies
are similar to some of those available on divorce. The qualified cohabitant may for instance, seek a
maintenance order against her former partner.242 If this is not sufficient, a pension adjustment order
may also be made, allowing the splitting of an existing pension to make provision for the qualified
cohabitant or the earmarking of a portion of one qualified cohabitant's pension for the benefit of the
other qualified cohabitant.243 Finally, if neither maintenance nor a pension adjustment order is
sufficient to support the financially dependent qualified cohabitant, the court may reallocate property
of either partner by means of a property adjustment order.244 Where a qualified cohabitant dies,
moreover, the survivor may make a claim against the deceased's estate if the survivor can show that
the deceased failed to make proper provision for the survivor, by will or otherwise.245
*Irish Jurist 245 Significant as these rights may sound, they are in fact curtailed in several important
respects. First, in general, these remedies are available only to a qualified cohabitant who is
financially dependent on the other qualified cohabitant where such dependence arises from the
relationship or the ending of it. 246 The only exception to this rule applies to a survivor seeking
provision from a deceased qualified cohabitant's estate where the couple were cohabiting at the time
of death: if the couple were still together at the time of death, financial dependence need not be
demonstrated.247 In all cases where the relationship ended before death, none of these redress
scheme remedies are available to a qualified cohabitant with independent means. The requirement
that the financial dependence must arise from “the relationship or the ending of it” may further curtail
the availability of relief. The implications of this caveat are as yet unclear, though it may well be
interpreted as requiring not simply that the applicant is financially dependent but that that state of
dependence itself is a product of the relationship or its demise rather than of factors that would have
arisen regardless of the relationship (such as unemployment or illness).
It is clear also that any right to relief is subject to the rights of spouses and civil partners of either
party. In granting a remedy under Pt 15 of the 2010 Act, the court must have regard to the rights and
entitlements of any spouse or former spouse, civil partner or former civil partner or dependent child or
child of a previous relationship.248 Section 173(5) expressly precludes the court from granting an order
that would affect any right of a person to whom a qualified cohabitant is or was married, thereby
prioritising the rights of spouses and former spouses. In the case of provision on death, the survivor
may only claim from the “net estate” of the deceased, the portion that remains after provision has
been made to satisfy the Succession Act rights of the deceased's spouse or civil partner.249 Indeed,
the 2010 Act expressly ring-fences the legal right share of spouses on the death of a qualified
cohabitant.250 In practice, this collectively means that the qualified cohabitant of an otherwise married
spouse may have limited recourse against the latter.
It is clear also that the type of relief envisaged for qualified cohabitants is not the “proper provision”
required in respect of civil partners and spouses, but is much more limited. Section 172 requires that
the relief be such that the court considers “just and equitable … in all the circumstances”. While the
2010 Act requires that the court have regard inter alia to the needs and obligations of the parties, their
financial circumstances and their contribution to home and family, the 2010 Act does not reference
the parties' pre-separation standard of living (divorce and civil partnership dissolution provisions do).
The cumulative implication is that the extent of the remedies made available to dependent qualified
cohabitants may be much more limited than those afforded to spouses and civil partners.
*Irish Jurist 246 Cohabitation agreements
A particular innovation of the 2010 Act lies in the introduction of an express right for cohabitants
generally to make agreements governing the financial and proprietary affairs of the couple. Section
202 of the 2010 Act allows cohabitants to enter into such agreements, though certain formalities must
be followed. The agreement must be in writing and signed by both parties following independent legal
advice, though the couple may opt to waive their right to independent advice and instead seek joint
legal advice. Under such agreements the couples may opt out of the redress scheme available to
qualified cohabitants, allowing the parties to avoid the imposition of remedies on the break-up of a
relationship. That said, a court may supersede any of the terms of such an agreement where its
enforcement would cause a serious injustice.
In allowing such agreements, s.202 clearly departs from the verdict in Ennis v Butterly, 251 which
determined that cohabitation agreements were contrary to public policy and thus not enforceable in
law. Given the strong constitutional underpinning to Kelly J.'s judgment, there may certainly be some
cause for concern as to whether the provisions of s.202 are in fact constitutional. The better view,
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however, may well be that, provided such agreements are confined to the financial and proprietary
affairs of the couple--and do not otherwise seek to emulate the consequences of marriage--they may
be constitutionally sound. The Law Reform Commission, for instance, took the view that Ennis v
Butterly did not preclude agreements between cohabitants generally, only those that sought to confer
a quasi-marital status on the couple.252 As such, provided an agreement “… does not attempt to
replicate the marriage contract, or does not have an immoral purpose, but restricts itself merely to
regulating the financial and property affairs of the parties”, it is likely, the Commission suggests, to be
upheld.253
There is a wider constitutional concern regarding cohabitation. While married couples and civil
partners may fairly be said, by their voluntarily entering into such unions, to have assumed obligations
of support to their partners, the same cannot arguably be said for qualified cohabitants. In the case of
spouses, attempts to challenge the extensive ancillary remedies available on judicial separation and
divorce have failed in, respectively, TF v Ireland 254 and more recently in LB v Ireland. 255 A similar
challenge against the ancillary remedies available to qualified cohabitants may stand a greater
chance of success. In particular, a qualified cohabitant might fairly say that, by choosing not to marry,
he or she has deliberately opted not to take on the obligations of support usually conferred on married
couples and civil partners, and that the award of an ancillary remedy may thus constitute an unjust
attack on the qualified cohabitant's property rights. Given, however, the very limited scope *Irish
Jurist 247 for relief in the 2010 Act, it is very possible that such a challenge would fail. For one, relief
is predicated on financial dependence arising from the relationship or the ending of it. The implication
is that the respondent has acted in a manner that has encouraged or caused this dependence by, for
instance, having a child with the applicant or encouraging the applicant to give up a job to look after
the couple's family or to assist the respondent in his career. It is likely that a court would consider the
imposition of financial responsibility a proportionate response to the situation, particularly where the
applicant is responsible for the birth of children.
CONCLUSION
Although ostensibly a straightforward word used commonly in daily discourse, the term “family” has
attracted significant ideological controversy. The ideological debate regarding the boundaries of the
family has sometimes found its way onto the statute books, as in the case of the since repealed s.28
of the Local Government Act 1988 (England and Wales), which sought to paint same-sex unions as
“a pretended family relationship”.256
The constitutional position on the family remains rigid and exclusive, denying the benefits of Art.41 to
families not based on marriage. The pending enactment of a constitutional amendment to address the
position of children may partly soften this stance. The wording propounded by the Joint Oireachtas
Committee on the Constitutional Amendment on Children, if adopted, would affirm the primacy of
children's rights.257 The amendment would, in particular, secure equal rights and recognition to
children born inside and outside marriage. Even in advance of such reforms, the Oireachtas, as
discussed above, has already acted to secure greater rights and recognition for couples living
together outside marriage and, in particular, for same-sex couples. The rights and obligations
conferred on civil partners, though extensive, are likely to withstand any constitutional challenge given
that they are confined to same-sex couples and unlikely to dissuade people from entering into an
opposite-sex marriage. In the case of both civil partnership and qualified cohabitation, great care has
been taken to ensure that the rights of spouses are not prejudiced by measures in the 2010 Act, such
that the measures could not be said to penalise marriage or married people.
The very limited nature of the rights and obligations conferred on cohabitants and the restrictions on
relief for qualified cohabitants, moreover, may render it less likely that constitutional difficulties will
arise in relation to the provisions addressing cohabitation and qualified cohabitation (though, in the
absence of a judicial challenge, one cannot be definitive on this point). It might be argued that the less
onerous nature of the obligations of qualified cohabitants *Irish Jurist 248 might induce some
people, anxious to avoid legal responsibility, to remain unmarried rather than marry. Logically, if that
were the case, one might equally say that conferring no rights at all on unmarried couples is
unconstitutional as it would make non-marital cohabitation especially attractive to such persons. In
sum, the measures adopted in this context appear to be a proportionate and relatively focused
response to the plight of potentially vulnerable parties who have become dependent within a
relationship. The better view may be that such measures will be considered to be constitutionally
sound.
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Certainly, the spectre of Ennis v Butterly nonetheless lingers, giving rise to uncomfortable doubts. It is
at least arguable, however, that judicial deference to the legislature will prevail. The courts have
increasingly insisted that social policy matters and, in particular, issues of political and social
controversy are primarily the preserve of the Oireachtas, and that the courts will intervene only where
a constitutional breach is very clearly established. The most likely outcome, therefore, is that provided
there is no penalty imposed on married couples and no inducement not to marry, the relevant
schemes will be upheld.
Even if this is so, however, the point remains that couples outside marriage cannot claim the
extensive and heavily entrenched protections offered by Art.41 of the Constitution. The result is that
such couples depend on legislative goodwill: any rights and obligations that are legislatively conferred
upon such couples may just as easily be removed by the legislature, with no constitutional
consequences. Thus, while Art.41 does not appear necessarily to preclude recognition by the
legislature of non-marital unions, it offers no protection to such couples. This is especially problematic
in the case of same-sex couples, who cannot legally marry. Given the historic stigma attached to
homosexuality, and the past (and often current) discrimination and ill-treatment faced by gays and
lesbians, the lack of constitutional protection for same-sex unions is especially indefensible. This
places such unions in a precarious position, though likewise the Constitution itself is compromised.
Absent reform, the likelihood is that the constitutional position will remain increasingly out of line with
the lived reality of family life in modern Ireland, undermining the Constitution's claim as a vibrant,
organic and dynamic document, capable of change in line with changed times and values.258
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